



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
BEAUMONT DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

VS.

JUAN PINEDA

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CASE NO. 1:07-CR-115(2)

**FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATION ON GUILTY PLEA**  
**BEFORE THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

The District Court referred this matter to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for administration of a guilty plea and allocution under Rules 11 and 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Magistrates have the statutory authority to conduct a felony guilty plea proceeding as an “additional duty” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). *United States v. Bolivar-Munoz*, 313 F.3d 253, 255 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002), *cert. denied*, 123 S. Ct. 1642 (2003).

On February 28, 2008, this cause came before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for entry of a guilty plea by the Defendant, Juan Pineda, on **Count 3** of the charging **Indictment** filed in this cause. Count 3 of the Indictment charges that on or about January 23, 2006, in the Eastern District of Texas, Abraham Padron Herrera and Juan Pineda, Defendants

herein, did knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute a Schedule II controlled substance, namely, cocaine, in an amount of less than five hundred (500) grams, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1).

Defendant, Juan Pineda, entered a plea of guilty to Count 3 of the Indictment into the record at the hearing.

After conducting the proceeding in the form and manner prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 the Court finds:

a. That Defendant, after consultation with counsel of record, has knowingly, freely and voluntarily consented to the administration of the guilty plea in this cause by a United States Magistrate Judge in the Eastern District of Texas subject to a final approval and imposition of sentence by the District Court.

b. That Defendant and the Government have entered into a plea agreement which was disclosed and addressed in open court, entered into the record, and placed under seal.

c. That Defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, that Defendant is aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea, and that the plea of guilty is a knowing, voluntary and freely made plea. Upon addressing the Defendant personally in open court, the Court determines that Defendant's plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats or promises. *See* FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2).

d. That Defendant's knowing, voluntary and freely made plea is supported by an independent factual basis establishing each of the essential elements of the offense and Defendant realizes that his conduct falls within the definition of the crime charged under 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

**STATEMENT OF REASONS**

As factual support for Defendant's guilty plea, the Government presented the following evidence, which was admitted into the record at the plea hearing. *See Factual Basis and Stipulation*. If the case proceeded to trial, the Government and Defendant agreed and stipulated to the information set forth in the factual basis which would be used by the Government in support of the Defendant's plea of guilty. The Government and Defendant agreed that the Government would have proven that Defendant is one and the same with the person charged in the Indictment and that the events described in the Indictment occurred on the dates and in the places alleged in the Eastern District of Texas. The Government and Defendant agreed that the Government would have proven, through the testimony of witnesses and through admissible exhibits, beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every essential element of the offense alleged; specifically, the Government would have proven certain stipulated facts set forth in the *Factual Basis*, on file in the record of this cause, as follows:

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) narcotics task force officers, and DEA South Central Regional Crime Laboratory analysts would have proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every essential element of the offense alleged in Count 3 of the Indictment. DEA task force agents would testify that, through a cooperating witness, they arranged to purchase cocaine from co-defendant Abraham Padron Herrera on three separate occasions. Some of the preliminary discussions for this purchase were recorded by the cooperating witness. Co-defendant Abraham Padron Herrera agreed to sell the cocaine on all three occasions and on

November 14, 2005, and January 23, 2006, arranged for defendant Juan Pineda to deliver a quarter-kilo and a half-kilo of cocaine, respectively, to an undercover officer in Dayton, Texas, for which \$3,750 and \$7300 was paid, respectively. Surveillance by DEA task force agents would corroborate that defendant Abraham Padron Herrera met with defendant Juan Pineda in Houston with the cooperating witness just prior to the January 23, 2006 transaction. Further, on February 21, 2006, defendant Juan Pineda delivered a half-kilo of cocaine, respectively, to an undercover officer in Houston, Texas, for which \$7100 was paid.

A laboratory analyst from the DEA South Central Regional Crime Laboratory would testify as an expert in the analysis of controlled substances that the three purchases on November 14, 2005, January 23, 2006, and February 21, 2006 were analyzed and determined to be cocaine, a schedule II controlled substance, with a weight of 247 grams, 499 grams and 461 grams, respectively.

DEA Special Agent Duke Covey, who is assigned to the Drug Enforcement Administration narcotics task force, would testify as an expert in drug trafficking and would testify that the amount of cocaine seized is indicative of drug trafficking.

Defendant, Juan Pineda, agreed with the facts set forth by the Government, as explained above, and signed the *Factual Basis*. Counsel for Defendant and the Government attested to Defendant's competency and capability to enter an informed plea of guilty. The Defendant agreed with the evidence presented by the Government and personally testified that he was entering his guilty plea knowingly, freely and voluntarily.

**RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION**

**IT IS THEREFORE** the recommendation of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge that the District Court accept the Guilty Plea of Defendant which the undersigned determines to be supported by an independent factual basis establishing each of the essential elements of the offense charged in **Count 3** of the charging **Indictment** on file in this criminal proceeding. The Court also recommends that the District Court conditionally accept the plea agreement.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, it is further recommended that, Defendant, Juan Pineda, be finally adjudged as guilty of the charged offense under Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1).

Defendant is ordered to report to the United States Probation Department for the preparation of a presentence report. At the plea hearing, the Court admonished the Defendant that the District Court may reject his plea and that the District Court can decline to sentence Defendant in accordance with the plea agreement, the federal sentencing guidelines and/or the presentence report because the sentencing guidelines are advisory in nature. The District Court may defer its decision to accept or reject the plea agreement until there has been an opportunity

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<sup>1</sup>“(3) Judicial Consideration of a Plea Agreement.

(A) To the extent the plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the presentence report.

(B) To the extent the plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(B), the court must advise the defendant that the defendant has no right to withdraw the plea if the court does not follow the recommendation or request.

(4) Accepting a Plea Agreement. If the court accepts the plea agreement, it must inform the defendant that to the extent the plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the agreed disposition will be included in the judgment.

(5) Rejecting a Plea Agreement. If the court rejects a plea agreement containing provisions of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court must do the following on the record and in open court (or, for good cause, in camera):

(A) inform the parties that the court rejects the plea agreement;

(B) advise the defendant personally that the court is not required to follow the plea agreement and give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea; and

(C) advise the defendant personally that if the plea is not withdrawn, the court may dispose of the case less favorably toward the defendant than the plea agreement contemplated.” FED. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)-(5).


to consider the presentence report. *See* FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3). If the Court rejects the plea agreement, the Court will advise Defendant in open court that it is not bound by the plea agreement and Defendant may have the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, dependent upon the type of the plea agreement. *See* FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(B). If the plea agreement is rejected and Defendant still persists in the guilty plea, the disposition of the case may be less favorable to Defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement. Defendant has the right to allocute before the District Court before imposition of sentence.

### **OBJECTIONS**

Within ten (10) days after receipt of this report, any party may serve and file written objections to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings of facts, conclusions of law and recommendations contained within this report within ten (10) days after service shall bar an aggrieved party from *de novo* review by the District Judge of the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations, and from appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court except on grounds of plain error. *Douglass v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n.*, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (*en banc*); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The constitutional safeguards afforded by Congress and the courts require that, when a party takes advantage of his right to object to a magistrate's findings or recommendation, a district judge must exercise its nondelegable authority by considering the actual evidence and not merely by reviewing and blindly adopting the magistrate's report and recommendation. *See Hernandez v. Estelle*, 711 F.2d 619, 620 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983); *United States v. Elsoffer*, 644 F.2d 357, 359 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.

1981) (per curiam).

**SIGNED this the 28th day of February, 2008.**

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Keith F. GIBLIN", written over a horizontal line.

KEITH F. GIBLIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE